Unsolved murders and the investigative failures of the Nigerian police force: Security and sociopolitical implications

This article focuses on the systemic failures of the Nigerian police force to unravel the mysteries surrounding homicides in the country, along with the security, social and political implications of the ongoing trend. The article draws on documented pieces of evidence of high-profile murders, along with the causes of the upsurge in murder incidences and the inhibitive factors relating to the investigative procedures of the police. The suitability of the theory of subaltern realism and the concept of third-world security predicaments in explaining the peculiarities of Nigeria’s internal security challenges is examined, along with the problems of the legitimacy of political regimes and weak borders. There is a need for the National Assembly of Nigeria to exercise its constituted powers in reawakening and supervising investigations into dormant cases of murder through its committees on police affairs, public safety and national security. The police should check its organisational failures, which may be related to using the wrong investigative approaches, low levels of information, limited resources, corrupt practices, and pressure to obtain quick results.     

Solving partially observable agent‐intruder games with an application to border security problems

In this paper, we introduce partially observable agent‐intruder games (POAIGs). These games model dynamic search games on graphs between security forces (an agent) and an intruder given possible (border) entry points and high value assets that require protection. The agent faces situations with dynamically changing, partially observable information about the state of the intruder and vice versa. The agent may place sensors at selected locations, while the intruder may recruit partners to observe the agent's movement. We formulate the problem as a two‐person zero‐sum game, and develop efficient algorithms to compute each player's optimal strategy. The solution to the game will help the agent choose sensor locations and design patrol routes that can handle imperfect information. First, we prove the existence of ?‐optimal strategies for POAIGs with an infinite time horizon. Second, we introduce a Bayesian approximation algorithm to identify these ?‐optimal strategies using belief functions that incorporate the imperfect information that becomes available during the game. For the solutions of large POAIGs with a finite time horizon, we use a solution method common to extensive form games, namely, the sequence form representation. To illustrate the POAIGs, we present several examples and numerical results.